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HEALTH CARE REFORM: PERSPECTIVES FROM
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION
AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Henry N. Butlerf & Jonathan R. Maceytt
INTRODUCTION
Health care currently consumes more than fourteen percent of
the United States' gross domestic product.' President Clinton has
proposed radically changing this entire segment of the economy by
offering a government-run system of universal health insurance.2 As
originally conceived, the Clinton plan would have provided certain
standard benefits-including hospital care, visits to physicians, and
prescription drugs-to all Americans through a system of regional
health care purchasing alliances, which were to have received their
funding through government subsidies and mandatory contributions
from employers and employees.3 Indeed, with the exception of em-
ployers of over 5000 people, all employers would have been required to
procure health insurance from their regional alliance, as well as to pay
for eighty percent of the costs of health insurance for their employ-
ees-up to 7.9% of payroll. 4 Furthermore, with few exceptions,5 the
Clinton plan would have required all Americans to enroll in a health
plan offered by their regional alliance.6 Those who failed to enroll
would be assigned to plans automatically and made to pay premiums
to their assigned plan.7 Never before has a politician proposed bring-
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1 Theodore R. Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, A Citizen's Guide to the Health Care
Reform Debate, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 496 (1994).
2 Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter HSA].
3 HSA §§ 1101 (benefit package), 1341-1375 (funding).
4 HSA § 6123; NFIB/HEAL, Study Criticizes Mandates, Business Subsidies in Clinton
Health Plan, 21 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 785, 786 (Apr. 18, 1994).
5 The exceptions are persons receiving Medicare, veterans benefits, or military bene-
fits or working for corporations employing more than 5000 people. HSA §§ 1002(a) (1)
(Medicare), 1004(a) (large corporations), 1004(b) (veterans, persons receiving military
benefits).
6 HSA§ 1001.
7 HSA § 1002.
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ing such a large part of the American economy under government
control outside of war time.8
In order to administer the new system, the Clinton plan would
have created 105 new government bureaucracies and enlarged 47
others.9 Because one of the primary objectives of this superstructure
would be to contain costs, a National Health Board, comprised of the
President's political appointees, would have to decide how much to
spend on health care, and would dictate what the average health plan
in each region could cost.10 The bill sought to forbid plans that cost
more than 120% of the average plan, thus limiting the amount that
people could spend on health care." As Elizabeth McCaughey ob-
served in her comprehensive analysis of the Clinton plan, "[t] he goal
[of the Clinton health care plan] is to curb spending by limiting what
every American is allowed to pay for health insurance."' 2 Predictably,
such radical proposals for change generated opposition. Largely in
response to concerns over the restrictive and mandatory nature of the
proposed system, the President's plan lost momentum and stalled out
in Congress.' 3
This Article employs the economic, or "interest group," theory of
regulation to explore the current debate about reform and regulation
of the health care industry. It will focus on the Health Security Act
(HSA), the work product of the Health Care Task Force which was
organized by President Bill Clinton and directed by Ms. Hillary
Rodham Clinton. Part I of the Article briefly contrasts the economic
theory of regulation with public-interest theory, and then proceeds to
discuss aspects of the economic theory that are of particular impor-
tance in understanding the health care debate. Part II provides a
brief discussion of the critical features of health care reform, and then
explores the interest-group aspects of those features.
Descriptively, this analysis will show that the critical features of
President Clinton's proposal were inconsistent with the traditional
public-interest approach to regulation, but were entirely consistent
with the economic theory of regulation. Through consideration of
the HSA, this analysis will cast doubts on the possibility of achieving net
improvements in social welfare through legislative reform of any sort.
8 American Survey: Kill or Cure?, EcoNoMIsr, Sept. 25, 1993, at 31.
9 All Things Considered, (National Public Radio broadcast Jan. 26, 1994) (interview
with Arlen Spectre), available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcript # 1374-20.
10 See HSA § 6001.
11 Elizabeth McCaughey, No Exit: What the Clinton Plan Will Do For You, NEw REPUBLIC,
Feb. 7, 1994, at 21.
12 Id.
13 J. Jennings Moss, Clinton Prescription Rejected by Body Politic, WAsH. Posr, Sept. 22,
1994, at A10.
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I
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION
A. Public-Interest Theory vs. Economic Theory of Regulation
Two competing theories have been offered to explain the role of
government in regulating society: the public-interest theory and the
interest-group (economic) theory. This section sets out the basic
frameworks of these two approaches.
Developed by A. C. Pigou, the public-interest theory of regulation
holds that regulation is designed to benefit the public by solving col-
lective action problems and intervening when the private market fails
to allocate resources properly.14 Public-interest theory maintains that
government should correct these failures through regulation, for ex-
ample, through taxes or subsidies designed to push markets toward a
"socially optimal" equilibrium. 15
To reach this conclusion about the role of government, public-
interest theory indulges some curious assumptions about the nature
of government. For example, public-interest advocates assume that
the government has the ability both to identify and to correct market
failures without cost.16 As McCormick and Tollison note, "the
Pigovian approach assumes an all-knowing, benevolent govern-
ment.' 7 Such presumptions have spawned the general criticism that
public-interest theory "is not a very believable theory of government
action."' 8
The economic, or "interest group," theory of regulation derives
from a starkly different view of government and the legislative
processes. To borrow Judge Richard Posner's description, the eco-
nomic theory of regulation "asserts that legislation is a good de-
manded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative
protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it,
regardless of overall social welfare."' 9 The theory further holds that
political actors behave just like private-sector consumers and busi-
nesses-they attempt to maximize their own self-interest.20 Thus, the
economic theory of regulation analyzes decisions made by politicians,
14 A. C. PiGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
15 For a description of the public-interest model, see ROBERT E. McCORMICK & ROB-
ERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMrY. AN INQUIRY INTO THE IN-
TEsr GROUP THEORY OF GoWERNmENT 3 (1981).
16 Id. at 3-4.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id. at 3.
19 Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution,
49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 265 (1982).
20 McCoRMICK & TOLLsON, supra note 15, at 5.
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bureaucrats, and interest-groups in accordance with generally ac-
cepted principles of rational economic behavior.21
It will be useful to examine the market for legislation in some
detail. On the demand side of the equation, interested parties form
distributional coalitions in order to pool resources and trade them in
exchange for legislation that provides private benefits to members of
the distributional coalition.22 Interest groups or coalitions of interest
groups that outbid their rivals obtain favorable legislation from the
politicians who populate the supply side of the equation. The cur-
rency used in the bidding takes "the form of campaign contributions,
votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright
bribes."23 Legislation flows to interest groups because politicians
need the resources these groups can provide in order to remain in
office.
The economic theory of regulation does not suggest that politi-
cians are necessarily evil, greedy, or venal. Rather, democracy by its
very nature places politicians in a Darwinian struggle for survival. To
win that struggle, politicians must receive more votes than their rivals.
Hence, they will compete with their rivals to demonstrate their supe-
rior ability and willingness to supply the legislation demanded by
those constituents who can best support their vote-getting efforts.
This process naturally focuses the attentions of politicians on in-
terest groups rather than on the mass of average citizens, because in-
terest groups are better able to provide the competitive political
resources that politicians need for survival than are highly diffuse, dis-
organized citizens. Unlike interest groups, citizens face high organiza-
tional costs that act as barriers to forming effective political coalitions.
Therefore, the economic theory of regulation focuses on the differing
organizational costs that rival political coalitions face.2 4
Efficiency considerations indicate that a group forms into an ef-
fective political coalition when the benefits from achieving wealth
transfered from the legislature outweigh the costs of organizing. For a
number of reasons, some groups will be able to organize into distribu-
tional coalitions more cheaply than others.25 In particular, groups
that have already formed into coalitions for exogenous reasons, such
as mutual professional interests (e.g., lawyers, doctors, and bankers),
will find that the marginal costs of diverting their activities to the polit-
ical arena are far outweighed by the benefits from the favorable legis-
21 Seid
22 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciay in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
23 Id.
24 McCoumicK & TOUSON, supra note 15, at 16-18.
25 Id.; MANCUR OLSON, THE RSE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: EcoNoMIc GROWTH, STAG-
FLATION, AND SoCIAL RIGIDITIES 18 (1982).
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lation such activities can procure. Thus, focusing on the factors that
influence the costs of forming an effective political coalition can en-
able economists, political scientists, and lawyers to predict the con-
tours of future legislation.2 6
To take a simple example, suppose a proposed piece of legisla-
tion will transfer $250 million to a particular interest group. Suppose
further that the legislation imposes direct costs (such as taxes) and
indirect costs (such as reductions in the efficiency of the economy)
totalling $20 on every man, woman, and child in America. Clearly,
passage of the legislation results in a net reduction of social welfare.
Nevertheless, the economic theory of regulation suggests that it will
pass. While the interest group will expend resources up to the full
amount of the prospective gain to ensure passage of the legislation,
no individual will be willing to spend more than $20 to ensure its de-
feat. However, by the time any individual spends the resources to (1)
learn about the existence of the proposal, (2) understand its merits
and implications, (3) search for and discover others willing to oppose
the legislation, (4) mobilize like-minded individuals to voice their op-
position, and (5) signal legislators that defeating the legislation is the
price of their support, the costs to the individual probably far out-
weigh the expected savings ($20) of defeating the legislation. Conse-
quently, the rational course of action of an individual citizen under
such circumstances is not only to refrain from organizing to oppose
the legislation, but also to remain ignorant of its effects and possibly
even ignorant of its existence. Hence, an interest group seeking to
obtain legislation with highly concentrated benefits and diffuse costs
can generally count on little popular opposition.
Thus, while qualifications sometimes are in order, the economic
theory of regulation generally predicts that legislation will be charac-
terized by concentrated benefits for discrete groups and widely dis-
bursed costs. Legislatures pass laws to benefit groups that can trade
political support in exchange for their passage, while the costs of such
legislation are shifted onto those in the worst position to object-the
amorphous and desegregated public. Moreover, the realities of the
political marketplace provide strong incentives for politicians them-
selves to search actively for issues where the winners are easily identi-
fied and vote their gratitude, while the losers are poorly identified and
unable to object effectively.2 7 The losers pay for legislation that bene-
26 See MCCORMICK & ToLLISON, supra note 15, at 18-22, 123-27.
27 Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Mode 86 COLUM. L. Rv. 223, 224 (1986) ("[Miarket forces provide
strong incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve private rather than public interests,
and hence statutes are supplied by lawmakers to the political groups or coalitions that
outbid competing groups.").
[Vol. 79:14341438
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fits interest groups through higher taxes, increased regulatory bur-
dens at all levels, and higher prices for goods and services.28
Within the economic theory of regulation, marginal conditions
still hold. By this we mean that politicians will continue to supply leg-
islation to favored groups until the benefits in the form of increased
political support are outweighed by the costs, which take the form of
opposition to such legislation from rival groups.2 9 After all, while poli-
ticians would like to pass uncontroversial legislation (i.e. legislation
that only harms scattered and unorganized individuals), that will not
always be possible. Virtually all interest groups have rivals, and indi-
vidual citizens can overcome rational ignorance through newspapers,
magazines, and television news accounts, and by organizing into inter-
est groups. Thus, at the margin, passing legislation that benefits spe-
cial interest groups is not without costs for politicians. Certain
individuals and groups are likely to oppose any new legislation, partic-
ularly the legislation that obviously serves no legitimate public pur-
pose, or that plainly benefits one special interest group at the expense
of another. In other words, politicians face an opportunity cost when
they pass laws. The benefits they receive in the form of increased
political support from certain groups are offset by the opposition that
the passage of such laws brings from other groups.30 Operating under
these constraints, the politicians' goal is to maximize net political
support.31
B. Aspects of the Economic Theory of Regulation That
Illuminate the Health Care Debate
Several aspects of the economic theory of regulation which are
particularly important to understanding the health care debate will be
considered below.
28 Jonathan P, Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Modek An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. RExv. 471, 478-80 (1988).
29 For example, the National Association of Manufacturers can be expected to galva-
nize into an effective political coalition to resist legislation proposed by trial lawyers at-
tempting to make it easier for plaintiffs to succeed in products liability suits.
30 A recent development in the Canadian health care system provides an interesting
example of a situation where politicians were able to incur relatively small political oppor-
tunity costs in passing legislation that was favorable to politically important groups. In
order to deal with rising health care costs and increasing budget deficits, the Canadian
government in April canceled the health insurance coverage of over 66,000 tax-paying Ca-
nadian residents who are in the country on temporary work visas. The decision saves the
Canadian government over $21 million and postpones the need for more unpopular fiscal
measures. According to Jane Fulton, a health care expert at the University of Ottawa,
"[t]he bureaucrats have targeted a vulnerable and less skilled group because they are least
likely to make a fuss." Anne Swardson, Canada's Vaunted Health Care System Limiting Cover-
age, Reducing Services, WAsH. Posr, April 19, 1994, at 12.
31 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theoy of Regulation, 19J. L. & EcoN. 211,
214 (1976).
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1. Exploitation of Asymmetric Control of Information by Politicians
and Interest Groups
As illustrated in the previous section, members of the general
public have little or no incentive, let alone ability, to promote gener-
ally beneficial laws or to oppose those contrary to the public interest.
The public remains rationally ignorant because the benefits of being
informed on social issues do not justify the costs of finding the
information.
This is not to say, however, that information will not find them.
Both interest groups and entrepreneurial politicians have a significant
stake in supplying voters with information. On the one hand, en-
trepreneurial politicians may seek out and identify issues and con-
cerns relevant to their constituents. Such politicians can move the
public to adopt the politician's point of view.3 2 In the process, en-
trepreneurial politicians may find it possible and convenient to form
their own interest groups around the issues they have chosen. In-
deed, Mancur Olson has observed that entrepreneurial politicians can
use "indoctrination and selective recruitment" to increase the homo-
geneity of the groups they organize,33 and to ensure that the groups
will have strong preferences for the laws they propose. To the extent
that the politician controls the supply of information to such groups
or to his constituents at large, he can control the formation of their
preferences.
On the other hand, independent interest groups may control the
generation and dissemination of information that goes to politicians
themselves.34 When, in turn, the politicians try to monopolize (or at
least dominate) the flow of information to the general public, they
end up presenting the issue in the light most favorable to the interest
group which supplied them with their information in the first place.
Indeed, because interest groups play a crucial role in supplying infor-
mation, particularly on technically complex subjects, 35 even well-in-
tentioned politicians, presented with one-sided information, may
honestly believe they are acting in the public interest when they are in
fact subject to partisan influence.
Ultimately, then, the information that reaches the rationally igno-
rant voter has passed through partisan filters. Thus, the superior abil-
ity of interest groups and entrepreneurial politicians to control the
32 OLSON, supra note 25, at 25.
33 Id.
34 GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS IN T=E UNITED STATES 113-14 (1981) (quot-
ing Senator Metcalf remarking on the essential function of lobbying groups in supplying
information, particularly on technical subjects); NoRMAN J. ORNSTEIN & SHIRLEY ELDER,
INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING AND POUCYMAKING 75-76 (1978).
35 See supra note 34.
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flow of information to the public has a profound effect on public
opinion about important issues.3 6 The man on the street may find
himself aligned in his opinions with an interest group, even when it is
not in his interest to be. That is not to say that the man on the street is
a fool; rather, politicians and/or interest groups contrive to deceive
him in ways that are difficult to recognize.
Politicians shape issues so that it is costly for the losers to learn
about their effects. One way to accomplish this is to couch special
interest oriented legislation in public interest terms. By doing this,
politicians may avoid some of "the political fallout associated with bla-
tant special interest statutes."37 Another strategy is to maximize the
ambiguity or complexity of legislation, thus making it difficult for the
public to discern its true ramifications.
2. Exploitation of Market Power by Politicians in the Market for
Legislation
Politicians have incentives to pass statutes that artificially increase
the demands for their services. This can be done in two ways. One
way is known as rent extraction.38 Rent extraction refers to the phe-
nomenon by which entrepreneurial politicians use the threat of im-
posing new regulation to extract political support from interest
groups who wish to remain free of regulatory interference.39 This tac-
tic is particularly useful where a group has made specific capital invest-
ments that can be expropriated in the political process.40
In addition, politicians can increase demand for their services by
lowering the political costs to interest groups of petitioning for regula-
tory assistance. Whereas a particular group may lack the organiza-
tional capacity to form an effective coalition to press for a particular
regulatory outcome, it may have sufficient organizational skills to peti-
tion for assistance if a program is already in place. By creating a sys-
tem of government benefits, and then inviting or requiring groups to
apply for assistance, politicians can artificially expand the demand for
their services. For example, social security programs currently in
place have spawned an entire cottage industry consisting of Congres-
sional aides who specialize in making sure that Congressional constit-
uents receive the social security benefits to which they are ostensibly
entitled.41
36 ORNsTrEIN & ELDER, supra note 34, at 33-34.
37 Macey, supra note 27, at 233.
38 Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102-03 (1987).
39 Id.
40 See i&
41 ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTFRJ. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS, 146 (1994).
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The following section will consider each of these aspects of the
economic theory of regulation within the context of the current de-
bate about reform of the health care industry.
II
HEALTH CARE REFORM
A. The Crisis in Health Care: Political Salience and Rational
Ignorance
One of the most interesting aspects of health care reform con-
cerns the debate over whether or not a genuine health care "crisis"
already exists in the United States. 42 The very fact that the question is
being debated in earnest is inconsistent with a public-interest theory
of regulation. It is, however, highly consistent with the economic the-
ory of regulation presented in this Article.
If the debate over health care reform were proceeding along a
path consistent with the public-interest theory of regulation, then the
presence or absence of a crisis would be irrelevant. After all, if politi-
cians and regulators were exclusively interested in furthering the pub-
lic interest, the only issue would be whether the public would benefit
from the passage of sweeping reform.
By contrast, the economic theory of regulation understands poli-
ticians to concern themselves primarily with estimating the demand
for new regulation relative to the strength of political opposition to
that regulation, and care only incidentally about the merits. The
health care "crisis" and plans for reform seem to conform to this
model of political behavior for two reasons.
First, the "crisis" characterization is important because of the
high-profile nature of the health care debate. Unlike other debates
such as those on the reauthorization of Superfund, or the determina-
tion of precise numeric quotas for certain Japanese products, every-
one has a clear and "immediate stake in the direction of health care
reform."43 Moreover, the health care issues have been the subject of
much public scrutiny. Consequently, with the stakes higher and infor-
mational barriers to organization lower, it will be easier than usual to
organize opposition by the general public. However, if proponents of
health care reform can characterize the health care industry as being
in a state of crisis, they can prevent public opposition from coalescing.
The presence of a crisis enables interest groups and entrepreneurial
politicians to neutralize opposition to radical reform by the eighty per-
cent of Americans who report themselves as being either "very" or
42 Irwin M. Stezer, There is No Health Care Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1994, at A12.
43 Id.
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"somewhat" satisfied with their own health care.44 It also permits "re-
formers" to surmount obstacles presented by deep and abiding public
skepticism of the government's ability to manage large segments of
the economy effectively.45 In short, only a crisis can overcome the
objections of an overwhelming majority of Americans to a regulatory
scheme they do not want.
Second, successfully characterizing the health care issue as a crisis
will enable politicians to create demand for health care reform, thus
turning a potential political liability into a political asset. As noted
above, entrepreneurial politicians will attempt to educate their (ra-
tionally ignorant) constituents about why they should invest resources
to support the issues that the politician has identified as important. If
politicians supporting health care can convince the general public
that there is a genuine crisis in health care, they will be able not only
to neutralize potential opposition to reform, but also to use "indoctri-
nation and selective recruitment" to add new support to the special
interests already committed to health care reform. If successful, such
indoctrination and selective recruitment can ensure that not only rele-
vant interest groups, but large segments of the general public as well,
will have strong preferences for the laws that entrepreneurial politi-
cians propose-even if those preferences are based on incomplete or
erroneous information.
The existence of a crisis facilitates indoctrination and selective
recruitment because people will be more likely to form opinions
about health care reform for consumption reasons-i.e., for the same
reasons that they follow professional sports, or international relations.
Even under ordinary circumstances, people enjoy the satisfaction that
comes from participation and expression. This is also a significant
reason why people vote.46 Forming an opinion on health care is even
more enjoyable if health care can be considered a crisis. It provides
cheap entertainment, and it is also a virtually costless vehicle for self-
definition.
However, it is important to distinguish between forming an opin-
ion on health care reform and truly mastering the intricacies of the
problem. Although the initial cost of ideological expression through
opinion formation is very low, the costs of overseeing implementation
of technically complicated statutes such as the HSA are extremely
high. Therefore, once the public has demanded regulation, interest
44 KARLYN H. BOWMAN, AMERicAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PUBLIC ATrTuDES ON
HEALTH CARE REFORM, ARE THE POLLS MISLEADING THE POLICY MAxERS? 21 (1994).
45 RobertJ. Blendon et al., The American Public and the Critical Choices for Health System
Reform, 271 JAMA 1539, 1543 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
46 Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 191, 193
(1988).
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groups, with their superior resources, can be expected to completely
dominate the details of the political process that ultimately formulate
policy.47 It is simply too costly for individual voters to (1) become
informed about precisely what sorts of health care legislation would
be best, (2) lobby for the implementation of this legislation rather
than a rival sort of legislation, and (3) monitor those who implement
the legislation even if it ultimately is enacted.48 The point Dwight Lee
has made about environmental programs therefore applies to health
care as well:
Predictably, there is little genuine public surveillance of environ-
mental protection programs, and organized groups have significant
latitude to influence (such) programs in ways that serve their pri-
vate interests. This means of course that these programs are far less
effective.., than they could be.
49
Thus, the successful characterization of the state of American health
care as a crisis will permit entrepreneurial politicians to "have their
cake and eat it too." They will pick up votes for supporting major
legislation that promises change, safe in the knowledge that the ra-
tional ignorance of the public will prevent it from understanding that
interest groups will control the details and implementation of the pro-
gram in exchange for their political support. Indeed, the special in-
terest groups' influence over the legislation will inevitably undermine
any positive benefits of the ideological expression of the public in sup-
port of the legislation. 50
Thus, characterizing the issues as being of crisis proportions
clearly serves the purposes of interest groups and entrepreneurial
politicians.
B. Rent Extraction
A second way in which the current debate reflects the economic
theory of regulation can be found in the existence of rent extraction
from certain market participants. The Clinton plan accomplishes this
in several ways, but the common theme is that by making credible
threats to impose significant costs on certain market participants, poli-
ticians can extract political support from these market participants in
exchange for an agreement by politicians to forbear from regulating
or to oppose regulatory initiatives proposed by others. This so-called
47 Id.
48 Id. at 196-97.
49 Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
50 For this reason, even organized interest groups often appear to support laws that
contain provisions that seem adverse to their interests.
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rent-extraction 5 ' aspect of the economic theory of regulation predicts
that, even if there is no major reform of the health care system, the
debate about health care reform should benefit politicians.
Certain core aspects of the current debate about health care re-
form correspond with classic efforts at rent extraction. First of all,
empirical observation suggests that the health care debate has already
succeeded in accomplishing a result which is the object of rent extrac-
tion. As the Associated Press reported recently:
Members of Congress considering proposals for reforming the
health care system are reaping a windfall in election-year contribu-
tions from industry groups most affected by the legislation, cam-
paign records show.
Health care and insurance lobbies have contributed $579,352
to members of the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee
during the 1994 election cycle, according to a review by The Associ-
ated Press of campaign reports on file with the Federal Election
Commission through March 31.
That represents nearly a threefold increase over the like period
in the last election cycle, when the same 11 lawmakers got $206,135
from health and insurance political action committees. 52
Thus, politicians have already been able to use the threat of health
care to augment their campaign war chests.
The vicious attacks on the pharmaceutical industry represent an-
other clear example of rent extraction in the current health care de-
bate.53 While much of President Clinton's rhetoric reflects a New
Democrat's embrace of economic logic and the effects of global eco-
nomic forces, his rhetoric about health care reform typifies a "populist
demonization" of the pharmaceutical industry.54 Because the phar-
maceutical industry accounts for only seven percent of health care
costs in the United States,55 it would seem an unlikely target for the
excoriation that it has received from the Clinton Administration.
Moreover, for an Administration almost obsessively concerned about
foreign trade (as evidenced by the intense personal lobbying of for-
51 By contrast, rent-seeking refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e. rates
of return on the use of an economic asset in excess of the market rate) through govern-
mental intervention in the market An example of rent-seeking is a firm's attempt to se-
cure government-granted monopolies or tariff protection. Such government-sanctioned
restraints on trade allow firms to increase their prices above competitive levels. The result-
ing profits represent economic rents from government regulation. Rent-seeking differs
from rent-extraction in that the latter term refers to efforts by private sector actors to resist
regulation that imposes costs upon them, rather than to attract regulation that provides
protection from competition.
52 Congressional Contributions Increase Considerably Fom Health Care Lobbie, CmusrsAN
SCL MoNrroR, May 12, 1994, at 2.
53 SeeJ.D. Kleinke, KillingDrug Research Kills People WALL ST.J., Feb. 16, 1994, at A18.
54 I&
55 Id,
1994] 1445
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
eign governments to obtain orders for the U.S. aerospace industry),56
it seems odd that the Administration is not supporting a "net export-
ing industry that turns basic research into marketable products while
creating and sustaining high-skill jobs."5 7
The Clinton Administration's attacks on the pharmaceutical in-
dustry appear quite perplexing if one adopts a public-interest theory
of governmental regulation. If anything, the Administration should
be encouraging high drug prices as an incentive to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry to develop new drug treatments that would replace more
expensive surgical procedures.
However, instead of encouraging increased revenue for research
and development, the Clinton plan would saddle drug manufacturers
with additional burdensome regulation. Under the Administration's
plan, The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) would be
given extensive power over drug manufacturers. As McCaughey
describes,
[The HHS Secretary] has the power to set a controlled price for
every new drug, and to require the drug manufacturer to pay a re-
bate to the federal government on each unit sold to Medicare pa-
tients at market price instead of the controlled price. If a producer
balks at paying the rebate, the secretary can "blacklist" the drug,
striking it from the list of medications eligible for Medicare reim-
bursement. The proposed regulation [thus] threatens to keep a
new drug such as Tacrine (a treatment for Alzheimer's) from older
patients.
Under the bill, the secretary weighs the development costs and
profit margin for the single drug, rather than the overall profitabil-
ity of investing in new cures. 5s
This would clearly stifle innovation. Because price controls look only
at the cost and profit margins on single drugs, rather than develop-
ment costs for the pharmaceutical firm as a whole, the impact of price
controls on incentives in research and development can be devastat-
ing.59 The mere proposal of price setting in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry "has already scared off investment capital, and scuttled the
plans of the American drug and biotech companies. Internal and ex-
ternal risk capital has dried up, forcing companies to shelve new prod-
ucts, cut [research and development], cancel waves of recruitment,
and issue tens of thousands of pink slips." 60 Approximately $520.8
million in stock offerings were canceled in 1993 under the threat of
drug price controls, and 35,000 people have been laid off by pharma-
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 McCaughey, supra note 11, at 25 (citations omitted).
59 Id. at 25 (discussing the impact of price controls on research into new cures).
60 Kleinke, supra note 53.
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ceutical manufacturers since the introduction of the Clinton health
care plan.6'
Additionally, the Administration is undoubtedly aware of solid
economic explanations for the high prices that exist for certain drugs.
For every drug that reaches the market, more than 1000 others do
not, resulting in complete losses for investors in those drugs.62 Thus,
"[I]imiting the price and profitability of the one drug in a thousand
that succeeds will halt research into new cures, including drugs for
ovarian and breast cancers now in the pipeline."63
Politicians in the Clinton Administration excoriating the
pharmaceuticals industry for price gouging also probably are aware
that expensive drug research can actually lower, rather than raise,
health care costs. Even very expensive drugs are cost effective if they
can eliminate the need for surgery, which is virtually always more ex-
pensive. Research by HCIA, a health care data analysis and research
firm, has found that
[e]very study of hospital clinical patterns conducted by our firm in-
dicates that the cumulative differences between the least efficient
medical pathway and the best approach represent multibillion-dol-
lar potential savings for the health care economy. Hospitals are ac-
tively pursuing such savings: their continued progress, the most
profound "reform" of all, will require continual development of
even better, if premium priced, medicines. 64
While price controls make little sense from a public-interest
standpoint, the economic theory of regulation suggests two perfectly
sensible reasons for them. First, the economic theory of regulation
predicts that rent extraction'is particularly likely to occur in an indus-
try which is characterized by fixed capital investments that cannot eas-
ily be shifted to other uses.65 The following example illustrates the
point. Imagine two industries, each earning the same risk-adjusted
rate of return on assets, say fourteen percent. One industry requires
only highly mobile, interchangeable capital investment, while the
other requires fixed capital investments that have no alternative uses.
If the government threatens to impose a dramatic regulatory burden
on the first industry, it will have little incentive to pay significant
amounts of political support to gain regulatory forbearance. If the
threat of regulation materializes, the industry will respond by simply
redeploying its assets to another use.
61 Id.
62 McCaughey, supra note 11, at 25.
63 Id
64 Kleinke, supra note 53.
65 McChesney, supra note 38, at 102-03.
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The second industry, by contrast, has much greater incentives to
purchase regulatory forbearance, because by definition the immobile
nature of it's assets makes impossible shifts to alternative uses. Thus,
for example, if the next best alternative use for the assets of the phar-
maceutical industry will yield only an eight percent rate of return,
rather than a fourteen percent rate of return, it will be in the interests
of the industry to pay politicians sums equivalent to the capitalized
value of six percent of its assets in exchange for regulatory forbear-
ance. In other words, the high cost of redeploying assets to alternative
uses leaves an industry vulnerable to rent extraction.
The pharmaceutical industry is characterized by its dedication to
and reliance upon product innovation. 66 This endeavor requires
large amounts of highly specialized scientific research,67 which is
highly capital-intensive. 68 In addition to some amounts of specialized
machinery, this research is characterized by a fixed, and thus ex-
propriable, nature. 69 The greater and more important portion of the
research investment is in human and other intangible manifestations
of capital. So much can be seen by the large concentration of phar-
maceutical research facilities in New Jersey.70 While some types of
capital may escape regulation by foreign relocation,71 pharmaceutical
companies cannot avoid the effects of price control on their locale-
specific investments in research capital by relocation offshore. Even if
price controls could be avoided by relocation, their effect on the value
of the product of the research investment, at least to the extent it is
realized in the U.S. market, would be a marked reduction and is not
avoidable.72 Firms will readily expend resources to provide political
66 James Driscoll, The Moral Battle Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1994, at A18; RichardJ.
Kogan, Clinton Rations Future Cures, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1994, at A18.
67 Kogan, supra note 66, at A18.
68 See supra note 53.
69 Appropriation of a firm-specific (or, in this case, industry/locale-specific) capital
investment stems from the existence of an appropriable quasi-rent. Klein et al., Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & EcoN. 297,
299-310 (1978). Appropriable quasi-rents arise when an asset is so specialized to a particu-
lar user [or industry-locale] that barrier costs prevent transfer of the asset to another appli-
cation without substantial loss of investment return. 1d. at 299.
70 Thomas J. Lueck, Pharmaceuticals' Blue Chip May Be Fading, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1993, at B1. NewJersey has become the nexus for world-wide pharmaceutical research.
Ten of the 18 largest pharmaceutical concerns in the world have their major operations,
especially research, located there. Perhaps explainable in terms of access to academic facil-
ities, to the complementary facilities of other firms, or the like, research in the pharmaceu-
tical industry is not so much firm-specific as locale-specific. The peculiar attractiveness of
this region may be demonstrated by the existing siting of foreign pharmaceutical firms,
and by their continuing relocation within the area. Id.
71 See Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuxE L.J. 173 (1989).
72 There must also be a consideration not only of investments presently made, but
also of the large sums expended in the past on research which has not yet come to fruition.
Considering the sometimes decades-long development process for new drugs, the value of
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support in order to avoid price controls and salvage the value of these
investments.
The locale-specific capital investment of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry presents a ripe target for rent extraction in another way. Un-
like doctors or hospitals, which are widely dispersed throughout the
nation, the concentration of the pharmaceutical industry in New
Jersey makes politicians' threat to regulate the industry more credible,
because the economic costs of such regulation will be borne by the
people of this state and the political costs by the state's representatives
alone. Furthermore, this geographic concentration increases the like-
lihood that the industry will be able to organize itself to make political
payoffs. In other words, even an industry characterized by fixed, and
thus expropriable, capital investments would not present a particu-
larly attractive target for rent extraction unless it were also capable of
organizing sufficiently to pay for regulatory forbearance.
Further, because the pharmaceutical industry accounts for a rela-
tively small percentage of U.S. health care costs,73 politicians' threats
to impose costs on the industry in the form of price controls are credi-
ble because the effects of these inefficient regulations may escape
public notice. Such inefficiencies will result largely from a reduction
in the flow of new drugs being developed and marketed.74 But be-
cause members of the general public will have no way of knowing
what life-saving cures would have been developed in the absence of
price controls, threats to regulate the pharmaceutical industry will im-
pose few, if any, political costs on politicians. Finally, unlike doctors,
who see patients, the pharmaceutical industry has no direct access to
the public. It cannot launch a cheap and effective grass roots cam-
paign to counter politicians' populist rhetoric against it.
The pharmaceutical industry then is a paradigm candidate for
rent extraction under the economic theory of regulation because of
its locale-specific capital investments, its capacity to organize political
considerable sums may be appropriable through the specter of regulation. See Kogan,
supra note 66, at A18.
73 The pharmaceutical industry accounts for seven percent of health care costs and is
a net exporter. Kleinke, supra note 53.
74 In Germany, similar inefficiencies have developed in response to governmental
regulation. The German government has enacted a drug budget which must be met by
doctors and pharmaceutical companies. If the amount spent on drugs exceeds the budg-
eted allotment, doctors will be held responsible for the first DM280 million of the excess
and pharmaceutical companies the next DM280 million. Naturally, doctors have re-
sponded to this measure by decreasing the amount of drugs they prescribe-especially the
more expensive and innovative drugs. As a result, pharmaceutical companies are finding it
less profitable to invest in research and development, potentially stalling the discovery of
new life-saving drugs. Annette Tuffs, Germany: Reaction to New Health Care Law, 341 Tim
LANcEr 427 (Feb. 13, 1993).
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payoffs in response to threats, and its inability to directly inform the
public of the costs of regulation.
C. Creating Future Demand for Regulation
By far the most important aspect of the economic theory of regu-
lation reflected in the current debate about health care concerns the
extent to which the debate has prompted interest groups to lobby for
new, artificial protection from competitive forces.75 In other words,
from the perspective of the economic theory of regulation, at the
heart of the debate about health care reform lies significant efforts at
rent creation by well-organized special interest groups.
1. The Shift From Core to Comprehensive Benefits
The shift from a "core" services concept to a "comprehensive"
benefits approach during the course of the policy debate about health
care reflects a major victory for interest groups trying to profit from
health care reform.76 Under a core approach, the government would
assure that those qualified to receive a public subsidy would get cer-
tain essential services.77 Other services could be purchased in the pri-
vate marketplace. 78 Access to these services would be allocated by the
price-setting mechanism of the marketplace. By contrast, under a
comprehensive approach the government guarantees all citizens a
package of medical services beyond what is merely necessary. 79
Clearly, health care providers will derive major advantages from
having their services included in the list of comprehensive benefits to
be provided by the government. Such inclusion would protect health
care providers from the vagaries of market forces by reducing the mar-
ginal costs of their offered services to zero.80 Consequently, health
care providers will be willing to pay to have their particular product or
service included in the list of products or services that all insurance
programs must require.8 ' Indeed, in Germany, which has long had a
75 In fact, according to Charles Lewis of the Center for Public Integrity, "[hiealth care
reform has become the most heavily lobbied legislative initiative in United States history."
Neil A. Lewis, Vast Sum Spent to Sway Health Plan, N.Y. TIMs, July 22, 1994, at A20.
76 James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform: The Policy Context 29 WAKE FoRs-r L. Ray.
15, 35 (1994) (describing the shift in the Clinton plan from a core services concept to a
comprehensive benefits concept).
77 Id. at 34-35.
78 Id. at 35.
79 Id. at 35-37.
80 This reduction is a function of the zero-cost availability of additional service. Em-
pirically, people with free access to health care services used about 50% more health care
services than those who had to pay, with no discernible difference in health outcomes.
Bulter, infra note 89, at 115.
81 The proliferation of state mandates on health insurance coverage demonstrates the
proficiency of health care providers at effecting the inclusion of various services. Jensen,
infra note 88, at 167-93.
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health care plan similar to that proposed by President Clinton,8 2 the
issues of which medical services are included on the list of benefits
"are so important that they can affect elections: coverage of abor-
tions, for example, will play a role in [German] elections this year.
The net result, Germany shows, is that the list simply grows over the
years." 83
Already in the United States there have been intense debates
about inclusion of treatment for alcoholism and drug abuse in the
comprehensive package.8 4 Of course, the very shift to a comprehen-
sive package of benefits from a core package of benefits represents a
major political victory for a host of health care providers.
The Comprehensive Benefits Package presented in President
Clinton's Health Security Act is extremely appealing to Congress. As
professed congressional concern about the federal deficit rises, it be-
comes more difficult to buy votes with traditional pork-barrel govern-
ment spending programs. Given this restriction, members of
Congress have considerable incentives to try to buy political support
through rent creation, thereby shifting the costs of providing benefits
away from the federal government. Naturally, politicians prefer this
over direct government spending, since they may avoid the high visi-
bility, and associated political costs, of on-budget spending while reap-
ing the same political rewards.
The Health Security Act presented Congress with a significant op-
portunity to obtain political support in exchange for regulatory action
whose costs would be kept off the balance sheet of the federal govern-
ment. In this respect, future reform efforts will be no different. Con-
gress is, and will inevitably be, the focus of the demands of health care
providers and certain consumers for generously mandated benefits.
Even with safeguards such as those in the HSA which specify that the
National Health Board is to determine the content of the comprehen-
sive benefit package,8 5 the economic theory of regulation predicts
that Congress would ultimately come to dominate the process, for ex-
ample by dictating the guidelines under which such a Board would
operate.8 6 In considering the initial enabling legislation, Congress
will always be positioned to extract substantial payments from every
82 Wilfried Prewo, Germany Is Not a Model, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1994, at A14.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Small Market Health Insurance Reform: Hearings Before the House Ways and
Means Commitee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 219-33 (1993) (statement of Ellen M. Weber, Co-
Director of National Policy Legal Action Center before the House Ways and Means
Committee).
85 HSA §§ 1101, 1151-1154; Butler, infra note 89, at 116.
86 This is seen in the specification of minimum benefits by the HSA. HSA § 1101.
The power of the National Health Board to affect those specified benefits is limited. HSA
§ 1152(a).
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provider group not obviously included in or excluded from the bene-
fits package. Psychologists, chiropractors, optometrists, dentists,
podiatrists, and allergists, for example, will be willing to invest substan-
tial sums to ensure their services are included. Moreover, the issue of
inclusion in or exclusion from the package will be a continual rent-
seeking battle as circumstances change, new interest groups or coali-
tions emerge, and budgets come up for renewal.
To put it prosaically, the economic theory of regulation predicts
that the deliberative process over the content of the comprehensive
benefits package will evolve into a congressional rent-seeking frenzy,
as politicians and interest groups jockey to include more and more
elaborate benefits in the mandated package. Indeed, the administra-
tion's failed plan illustrates this precisely. Patricia M. Danzon, Profes-
sor of Health Care Systems at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania and perhaps America's foremost authority on the eco-
nomics of health care, noted that the Clinton plan's package of bene-
fits was "comparable to at least the median of plans offered by the
Fortune 500 companies [and] is more comprehensive than the aver-
age person appears willing to pay for voluntarily, even with the cur-
rent tax subsidy, which, on average, reduces the cost of coverage by at
least one-third."8 7
The magnitude of the distributional effects flowing from the defi-
nition of the comprehensive benefits package will be enormous. As
noted above, Germany's experience indicates that the determination
of what is included in the basic package will become highly
politicized. Closer to home, the states' experience with interest-group
domination of the bargaining process for determining the content of
basic health insurance policies highlights the potential role of interest
groups in defining the comprehensive benefits package on the federal
level. Specifically, there has been an explosion of state mandates on
health insurance coverage. 8 Such mandates represent little more
than concessions to special interests to force consumers to buy cover-
age for specific diseases or medical practices that are not needed or
wanted. John Goodman of the National Center for Policy Analysis es-
timates that there are "more than 1,000 state mandates today, up from
forty-eight in 1970."89 Mandated services include chiropractic care,
psychological services, optometry, podiatry, nurse-midwife services, so-
cial work, and acupuncture. Other mandates require consumers to
purchase coverage for alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, and
87 PATRIcrA M. DANZON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, GLOBAL BUDGETS VERSUS
COMPETrrrvE COST-CONTROL STRATEGIS 10 (1994).
88 Gail A. Jensen, Regulating the Content of Health Plans, in AMERICAN HEALTH PoLlC.
CRITICAL ISSUES FOR REFORM 167-93 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993).
89 Henry N. Butler, The Political Market for Mandated Health Care Benefits Under the Pro-
posed National Security Acg 3 KANSASJ. LAw & PUB. PoL'Y 113, 115 (Winter 1993-94).
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even "accidental ingestion" of cocaine, marijuana, morphine, halluci-
natory drugs, and other controlled substances. 90 The escalation of
state mandates has been disastrous to health care policy. Goodman
estimates that one-quarter of persons currently uninsured could af-
ford basic, no-frills health coverage if some or all of these state man-
dates were repealed.91 Even Paul Starr, one of the leading
proponents of the Clinton health care plan, has observed that "past
experience suggests caution because of the dominant influence of
provider interests in state health policy."92
Similarly, the experiences with congressionally mandated in-
creases in Medicaid benefits suggest that members of Congress will
eagerly meet the demands of consumers and interest groups, since
most of the costs of additions to the comprehensive benefit package
are to be paid by employers, employees, and state governments.93
During the 1980s Congress placed additional burdens on states by ex-
panding Medicaid coverage for the poor without voting for the funds
to pay for the expansion. 94 Under Medicaid, Congress pays about
fifty-seven percent of the cost of new benefits. 95 Because Congress can
win votes by expanding Medicaid coverage without voting for full
funding for the new benefits (i.e., by requiring the states and private
individuals to pay for coverage), Medicaid has become the fastest-
growing item in state budgets, ahead of schools, roads, and prisons.96
To reduce Medicaid outlays, states are cutting reimbursement rates to
doctors and hospitals.97 Thus, the political costs of congressional ac-
tion are effectively shifted onto state politicians. Furthermore, be-
cause of lower reimbursement rates, many doctors refuse to treat
Medicaid patients-effectively denying the poor the very health care
promised to them by politicians. 98
Under the HSA, Congress would have paid an even lower per-
centage of the cost of new health care benefits than under Medicaid.
Consequently, the perverse incentives Congress faces under Medicaid
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Paul Starr, Design of Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives, 12 HEALTH An . 58, 62
(Supp. 1993).
93 See Don Colburn, Medicaid: A Safrty Net With Some Holes, WASH. PoST, July 28, 1992,
(Health Magazine), at 19. A further consideration is the hidden effects of cost-shifting,
where health care providers are not fully reimbursed by government payments and must
recoup the outstanding costs by adjusting upwards the bills of private providers and indi-
viduals paying out of pocket. Charles T. Carlstrom, The Government's Role in the Health Care
Industy: Past, Present, and Future, ECON. COMMENTARY (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
OH), June 1, 1994.
94 Colburn, supra note 93.
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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would have been exacerbated under the HSA. This issue would arise
in the initial debate about how to expand the basic benefits package,
and would continue as politicians, consumers, and interest groups be-
gan to demand more health care benefits. Like Medicaid, reform leg-
islation such as the HSA would present Congress with an unavoidable
moral hazard: Congress could sell interest-group legislation, satisfy
constituent calls for more benefits, and not have to worry about most
of the cost.
The political moral hazard was compounded under the HSA by
the fact that it would have limited the current tax deductibility of em-
ployers' expenditures for medical benefits as an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense 99 to the level of the comprehensive benefit
package mandated in the proposal. 100 This would have induced
employers to join the lobbying effort to expand the basic benefits
package: By including all of the benefits being offered in the compre-
hensive benefits package, employers would have received what is, in
essence, a public subsidy in the form of a tax deduction, for the bene-
fits they offered employees.
One aspect of the HSA's financing proposal, however, could have
provided positive political incentives for cost containment by Con-
gress. The Clinton plan would have capped employers' and employ-
ees' contributions for health insurance at a certain percentage of total
payroll costs. This would have, in theory, required Congress to fi-
nance additional benefits that were to be included in the basic bene-
fits package in the future. Even under Medicaid, however, Congress
has not proven itself capable of resisting the urge to impose tremen-
dous new costs on the states when it imposes new federal mandates.
Thus, if experience is a guide, Congress will not be able to stop itself
from buying votes with other people's money simply by increasing the
caps on the amounts of employers' contributions to pay for health
care or by elasticizing whatever self-restraint mechanisms may exist.
The German experience corroborates this analysis. The German
health care payroll tax rose from an average of 6% in 1950 to 8.4% in
1960, to 11.4% in 1980.101 It currently stands at 13.4%.102 In Ger-
many, the 13.4% payroll tax is needed to finance health care expendi-
tures that amount to 10.6% of GDP.103 Meanwhile, under the Clinton
plan a maximum payroll premium of about 10% is intended to pay for
health costs that account for 14% of current GDP today,10 4 and will
99 I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988).
100 HSA § 7201(a).
101 Prewo, supra note 82.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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account for 17.3% of GDP by the year 2000.105 As Wilfried Prewo, the
head of the Hanover, Germany, Chamber of Commerce noted in ana-
lyzing the Clinton health care plan, it is unclear how a payroll tax of
10% will finance health care expenditures that amount to between 14
to 17% of GDP, when a 13.4% payroll tax in Germany is unable to
finance only 10.6% of GDP in that country. 10 6 Thus, the financial
gimmickry has already begun. When the program is fully operational,
one should only expect more of the same as politicians face escalating
health care costs and insufficient payroll tax revenue. 10 7
2. The Requirement of Universal Coverage
In addition to the extremely comprehensive guaranteed benefits
package, the Clinton plan would also require that everybody receive
coverage. Indeed, President Clinton has described this promise of
universal coverage as the one non-negotiable demand in his legislative
package.'08 Under the plan, all Americans must enroll in one of the
regional health care alliances in their communities, unless they re-
ceive Medicare, military benefits, or veteran's benefits, or work for a
company with more than 5000 employees. 10 9 The analysis of this re-
quirement under the economic theory of regulation is straightfor-
ward. By requiring that everybody receive health insurance, whether
they want it or not, the administration artificially inflates the demand
for insurance. Reports on the precise number of uninsured vary
greatly, ranging from 5.5 million to 37 million," 0 depending upon
whether one is trying to determine the number of chronically unin-
sured or simply the number of people who are uninsured at any par-
ticular time."' Some of this number represents people whose health
profiles cause them to present great risk to insurance companies.
However, a significant number is comprised of people who are in ex-
cellent health, and therefore do not consider health insurance to be a
good "buy." Such risk taking is not irrational for the young and
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 The British system of universal health care coverage provides a disturbing example
of such financial gimmickry. Though the British system is able to boast the second-lowest
proportion of national income spent on health care (6.5% in 1993) and only a 1% increase
in 12 years, such impressive figures have come at the expense of health care availability to
British citizens. Though the British government has no official rationing policy, there is de
facto rationing as budget restrictions force doctors to control costs "by putting patients on
waiting lists, by denying some services or procedures to certain patients, and by denying
other treatments altogether." Timothy Harper, What We Can Learn From Europe, 70 MED.
ECON. 138, 143-44 (1993).
108 Dana Priest & David S. Broder, Veto Threat Cleaves Congress, WASH. PoST, Jan. 27,
1994, at Al.
109 HSA §§ 1001-1006.
110 Stelzer, supra note 42.
11 Id.
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healthy, for whom the probability of illness is low, and for whom pay-
ing health insurance premiums simply involves transferring wealth
from themselves to the least healthy members of the insured cohort.
Forcing healthy and uninsured people to pay health care premiums
transfers income from such people to insurance companies as well as
to the unhealthy people their premiums subsidize. In addition, these
premiums will have been diverted from other presumably more effi-
cient uses. In regard to unhealthy, uninsured people, it must be
remembered that eighty-eight percent of the hospitals in the United
States are not-for-profit institutions. The emergency rooms of such
hospitals cannot legally deny medical care to any patient who needs
it. 112 Similarly, such hospitals cannot unreasonably deny access to the
hospitals' health maintenance technology for the duration of the
course of treatment; contrary to popular belief, access to treatment is
not limited to the duration of the emergency."13 Indeed, per-capita
health care spending on the uninsured, pre-Medicare population con-
stitutes fully sixty percent of per-capita expenditures by the insured
population."14
The inclusion of this latter group, the presently healthy and unin-
sured, provides a windfall to the insurance companies because these
people pay premiums to insurance companies and receive few medi-
cal services in return. That the former group is also included under
the HSA poses no problem to the insurance companies, however, so
long as the insurance companies can fully price the associated risks.
3. Cartelization and Affirmative Action in Health Care
The Clinton health care initiative reflects yet another basic tenet
of the economic theory of regulation. Its requirement that by 1998 no
more than forty-five percent of new doctors be permitted to go on to
advanced training in a specialty is consistent with textbook rent-seek-
ing theory.1 5 Return on human capital for practitioners of lucrative
specialties will increase dramatically under the Clinton health care
plan because the plan artificially restricts entry into those specialties.
As noted above, the classic example of rent seeking is the effort to
obtain economic rents on the use of an economic asset (including
human capital) through governmental intervention in the market-
place.
These new quotas for medical specialties follow the classic pattern
predicted by the economic theory of regulation in which the govern-
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 HSA §§ 3011-3013; McCaughey, supra note 11, at 24; doctors in training will be
assigned to specialties based partly on race and ethnicity.
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ment creates an artificial cartel in order to benefit some favored
group at the expense of the public at large. Typical of this pattern,
the regulations are embedded deep within some ancillary regulatory
scheme of extreme complexity, in order to maximize the information
costs the general public will incur.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed health care reform from the perspective
of the economic theory of regulation. The Clinton health care plan
reflected all of the classic features of rent-seeking legislation. First,
the public was manipulated by loud and frequent cries that the health
care system is in a state of extreme crisis. This enabled the Adminis-
tration to quiet those who wonder why fourteen percent of the na-
tion's GDP should be brought under a new regulatory system
characterized by bureaucratic command and control. Next, the pro-
posed regulations were of such sweeping complexity that few in the
general public could be expected to read them, much less understand
their implications. Finally, by defining a system of universal coverage
more generous than that received by the average American, and then
promising people that such coverage will come at lower cost than the
coverage they currently receive, the Administration has created in the
public the false hope of a universal free lunch. The Administration
has never tried to explain how it can reconcile its promises to mas-
sively expand the quantity and quality of coverage with its equally
loud promises of lower total spending on health care. Consistent with
the economic theory of regulation, the Administration is relying on
the fact that the rational ignorance of the average citizen ensures that
these pie-in-the-sky promises will go unchallenged.
Beneath the superficial debate taking place in public is the real
health care controversy, which consists of the life and death struggle
among interest groups to avoid the costs and obtain the benefits avail-
able in this massive restructuring of the American economy. The Ad-
ministration has utilized both rent-extraction and rent-creation
techniques in its health care reform proposal. The results of this strat-
egy are already apparent, as interest groups dramatically increase their
political involvement and their expenditures on lobbying.
Not since Franklin Roosevelt's War Production Board has govern-
ment proposed to bring such a large part of the economy under its
own control.116 The economic theory of regulation provides the tools
with which better to understand the public presentation and market-
ing of health care reform proposals and to discover not only the pre-
cise nature of the plans themselves, but the likely course of their
116 ECONOMIST, supra note 8, at 31.
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future evolution. No matter the shape future attempts at health care
reformation take, the principles outlined here allow a basis for evalu-
ating the likely political and economic consequences of future legisla-
tive initiatives.
